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FORCEFUL MINIMALISM, HEIN V. FREEDOM FROM 
RELIGION FOUNDATION, INC., AND THE PRUDENCE OF 
“NOT DOING” 
Brendan R. McNamara 
Abstract: Proponents of judicial minimalism argue that courts should issue narrow rulings 
that address only the issues necessary to resolve the case at hand and should avoid needlessly 
broad rulings that could result in unforeseen consequences. The recent Supreme Court 
decision in Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. provides a compelling case 
study of judicial minimalism. Resisting opposing calls for broader rulings from both the 
concurring and dissenting justices, a plurality of the Court followed a minimalist approach to 
resolve a difficult question of taxpayer standing. Generally, federal taxpayers do not have 
standing to challenge government expenditures of tax funds in federal court. In Flast v. 
Cohen, the Court carved out a narrow exception for challenges to expenditures that allegedly 
violate the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. This exception requires a connection 
between the constitutional violation and Congress’s use of its taxing and spending power. 
Hein involved a challenge to purely executive actions, and the Court faced the issue of 
whether to expand Flast to cover such actions. While some Justices called for completely 
overruling Flast in all situations and others called for expanding Flast to cover purely 
executive actions, the plurality took a narrower approach, denying standing without 
expanding or contracting the taxpayer standing doctrine. This Note builds on prior 
scholarship that advocates for judicial minimalism by arguing that Hein’s plurality opinion 
demonstrates judicial minimalism succeeding in practice. 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Brandeis famously said about the Supreme Court’s role, “[t]he 
most important thing we do is not doing.”1 Judicial review, the power to 
strike down laws, essentially amounts to the power to negate the acts of 
the popularly elected and politically accountable branches of 
government. This power is not one to wield lightly. Rather, judicial 
review “is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the 
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy . . . .”2 Judicial 
minimalists embrace the view that courts should only do as much as 
necessary to dispose of the case at hand and no more.3 If all judicial 
                                                     
1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS 71 (2d ed. Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962). 
2. Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892). 
3. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 
ix−x (1999). 
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decisions run the risk of being wrong, minimalist decisions run this risk 
only when necessary. 
This Note uses a recent Supreme Court decision, Hein v. Freedom 
From Religion Foundation, Inc.,4 to argue for judicial minimalism as a 
general method of adjudication. In Hein, the Court faced a choice 
between issuing a narrow or broad ruling.5 The case presented an issue 
of standing—specifically, whether federal taxpayers have standing to 
challenge executive actions that allegedly violate the Establishment 
Clause.6 Justice Alito’s plurality opinion denied standing on narrow 
grounds by distinguishing prior precedent.7 Justice Scalia, joined by 
Justice Thomas, argued for a broad resolution that would overrule 
precedents on which standing could be based and thereby deny 
standing.8 The dissent argued for interpreting prior precedents 
expansively to allow standing.9 Justice Kennedy also wrote a separate 
concurrence discussing concerns about separation of powers.10 
This Note argues that Justice Alito’s plurality opinion in Hein 
resolves the case in the best way. This view contradicts that taken by 
many of the legal commentators who reacted to the case when the 
opinions were issued.11 Further, this Note analyzes the divergent 
jurisprudence of Justice Alito’s and Justice Scalia’s opinions in Hein, 
explores how the facts in Hein fit into taxpayer standing doctrine, and 
                                                     
4. 551 U.S. ___ (June 25, 2007), 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007). 
5. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 10−11 (discussing how minimalists prefer rulings to be narrow 
rather than wide). Although Professor Sunstein uses “wide” rather than “broad,” this Note uses the 
term “broad” as synonymous and interchangeable with “wide.” 
6. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2559. 
7. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy joined this opinion. Id. For discussion of how this 
opinion distinguished prior precedents, see infra Part III. 
8. Id. at 2573−74 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
9. Id. at 2584 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the dissent. 
Id. 
10. Id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
11. See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, Three Important Developments Involving Law and Religion 
During The Summer of 2007, FINDLAW’S WRIT, Sep. 6, 2007, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20070906.html (describing the plurality’s reasoning as 
“intellectually and morally indefensible”); Posting of David Stras to SCOTUSblog, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/commentary-and-analysis/the-significance-of-hein-part-two-of-two/ 
(June 26, 2007, 15:49 EDT) (questioning the plurality’s basis for distinguishing the facts of Hein 
from Flast v. Cohen); Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/06/bomb-throwers-and-dismantlers-some.html (June 25, 2007, 
13:55 EDT) (describing the Hein plurality as “a decision that made little sense as a principled 
matter”). 
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argues that the plurality’s minimalist approach best exemplifies the 
prudence of “not doing” more than necessary to resolve a case. This 
narrow ruling avoids a drastic change in a settled area of law that has not 
proven to need an abrupt about face, while leaving room in the future for 
further modifications as they may prove necessary upon consideration of 
cases with facts that compel broader judicial action. 
Part I of this Note provides background on judicial minimalism and 
explains how standing doctrine and stare decisis accord with 
minimalism. Part II summarizes the development and status of federal 
taxpayer standing doctrine before Hein, providing context for the 
precedents that Justice Scalia would overturn and noting the narrow 
manner in which the Court has both written and construed these 
precedents. Part III analyzes Hein’s separate opinions, compares the 
case’s facts to prior precedents, and explains which opinion of the 
fractured Court controls. Finally, Part IV explains why minimalism is 
the best solution for Hein and explores areas where minimalism will not 
be the best approach. 
I.  MINIMALISM, STANDING DOCTRINE, AND STARE 
DECISIS LIMIT THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS 
Minimalism, standing doctrine, and stare decisis all further a common 
purpose of limiting the role of federal courts,12 along with other 
doctrines like constitutional avoidance13 and Pullman abstention.14 
Taken together, these doctrines further the minimalist goal of doing as 
little as necessary and resolving cases narrowly. 
To illustrate, Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.15 
epitomizes minimalism’s virtues. The case involved an Equal Protection 
                                                     
12. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 262 (linking minimalism to standing and other methods of 
limiting the reach of judicial decisions). 
13. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345−48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (listing when the Court should and should not rule on the constitutionality of a 
congressional statute). 
14. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Pullman created an equitable 
abstention doctrine to discourage federal courts from hearing disputes over difficult constitutional 
issues when a case could be resolved on state law grounds; thus, the doctrine may be viewed as a 
form of constitutional avoidance. See Martha A. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. 
L. REV. 590, 590 (1977); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1188−90 (5th ed. 2003). 
15. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
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challenge to segregation on railroad cars,16 a direct attack on another 
famous railroad segregation case, Plessy v. Ferguson.17 While the Court 
unanimously overruled Plessy in 1954,18 this consensus may not have 
been possible thirteen years earlier in Pullman.19 In dismissing the 
federal lawsuit and leaving the issue—whether the Texas Railroad 
Commission had the authority to issue the contested order20—to be 
resolved on state law grounds,21 the Court prevented an unnecessary 
decision on the merits. How might the law have developed if the Court 
reached the merits in Pullman and reaffirmed Plessy in 1941? 
Alternatively, considering the resistance to the unanimous Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka22 decision thirteen years later, what would 
have happened if a narrow majority overruled Plessy in 1941? 
Minimalists seek to avoid ensnaring unelected judges in these political 
traps. The following sections of Part I describe the doctrines of 
minimalism, standing, and stare decisis in greater detail. 
A. Minimalist Judges Resolve Each Case on Narrow Grounds 
Judicial minimalists23 decide only the issues necessary to resolve each 
case or controversy, while leaving extraneous issues to be resolved 
another time, if at all.24 The point of minimalism is to write narrow 
opinions that only address the issues necessary to adjudicate a case, 
                                                     
16. Id. at 497−98. 
17. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
18. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494−95 (1954). 
19. See Judith Resnick, Rereading “The Federal Courts”: Revising the Domain of Federal 
Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1039 (1994) 
(“In 1941 it was, I take it, not obvious how federal constitutional law would decide this question. It 
was not easy because national norms did not readily trump local customs and prejudices, indeed 
because national norms may well have shared such prejudices.”); FALLON ET AL., supra note 14, at 
1189−90. 
20. The Texas Railroad Commission issued an order mandating that all sleeping cars operated in 
Texas be operated by conductors (who were exclusively white) rather than porters (who were 
exclusively black). See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 497–98. If Texas law did not grant the Commission the 
power to issue such an order, that would render the federal Equal Protection challenge moot. See id. 
at 501.  
21. Id. at 498−99. 
22. 347 U.S. 483, 494−95 (1954). 
23. This Note treats judicial minimalism as a jurisprudential lens through which to view 
procedural doctrines such as standing and stare decisis. This explains why this Note proceeds first 
with a discussion of minimalism and then with a discussion of standing and stare decisis. 
24. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at ix (“A minimalist court settles the case before it, but it leaves 
many things undecided.”). 
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rather than to write broad opinions designed to address entire swathes of 
potential cases.25 While minimalism is a form of restraint, minimalism 
differs from the concept of judicial restraint because the latter focuses on 
giving deference to decisions of the political branches.26 In contrast to 
judges embracing judicial restraint, a minimalist judge has no problem 
striking down popularly enacted laws if the resolution of a case demands 
that result.27 Mindful both of the apparent contradiction of allowing non-
elected federal judges to strike down popularly enacted laws within a 
democratic system of government,28 and of the inherent risk that any 
decision might lead to negative consequences,29 the minimalist exercises 
restraint by resisting the urge to rule broadly. 
Minimalism is a natural outgrowth of the common-law system.30 
Rather than laying out broad rules designed to apply prospectively to a 
wide range of situations, courts build the common law as a wall in which 
each case forms a brick.31 The common law accretes over time from the 
resolution of individual fact scenarios into a body of precedent that 
guides subsequent judges by analogy in a wide range of situations.32 If 
one case proves to have been incorrectly decided, a later judge may 
replace that brick without having to build an entirely new wall.33 
                                                     
25. See id. at 10 (“[M]inimalists try to decide cases rather than to set down broad rules.”). 
26. See id. at x (“Judicial minimalism can be characterized as a form of ‘judicial restraint,’ but it 
is certainly not an ordinary form.”); id. at 261 (“A maximalist, for example, may be entirely devoted 
to the principle of judicial restraint; consider the idea that all congressional enactments should be 
upheld.”). For an example of using the term “judicial restraint” to refer to minimalism, see In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Henderson, J., 
concurring) (advocating “judicial restraint” in ruling on the existence of a federal reporter-source 
privilege “[b]ecause my colleagues and I agree that any federal common-law reporter’s privilege 
that may exist is not absolute and that the Special Counsel’s evidence defeats whatever privilege we 
may fashion, we need not, and therefore should not, decide anything more today than that the 
Special Counsel’s evidentiary proffer overcomes any hurdle, however high, a federal common-law 
reporter’s privilege may erect.”). 
27. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at x (“Minimalist judges are entirely willing to invalidate some 
laws.”). 
28. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 16−23. Professor Bickel called this the “Counter-Majoritarian 
Difficulty.” Id. 
29. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 46. 
30. Cf. id. at 44 (“Judges who rely on cases can reduce the burden of decisions; at least for the 
individual judge, reliance on past cases may well be better on this count than attempts to build law 
from the ground up.”). 
31. See id. 
32. See id. at 42 (“Analogical reasoning is part and parcel of . . . minimalism. It is of course a 
hallmark of legal reasoning to proceed by reference to actual and hypothetical cases.”). 
33. See id. at 44 (“[P]ast cases might well be distinguished if they seem to go wrong as applied to 
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B. Standing Doctrine Accords with Minimalism 
Standing doctrine ensures that federal courts only exercise their 
power when necessary to resolve a valid dispute between adverse 
parties. Article III of the United States Constitution grants jurisdiction to 
enumerated types of “Cases” and “Controversies,”34 and federal courts 
have interpreted this jurisdictional limitation to restrict the power of the 
federal courts to rule on actual cases and controversies.35 Standing, 
along with related justiciability doctrines,36 maintains the separation of 
powers of the three branches of government by defining “the proper––
and properly limited––role of the courts in a democratic society.”37 To 
borrow a famous phrase from the administrative law context, standing 
helps ensure that the federal judicial power remains “canalized within 
banks that keep it from overflowing.”38 The Court has firmly established 
that standing is an essential part of separation of powers.39 
Like its fellow justiciability doctrines, standing reduces the reach of 
federal judicial power. To the judicial minimalist, this is desirable. Just 
as minimalism counsels that courts should rule only on the issues 
necessary to resolve each case, it also insists that courts should resolve 
each case only when given the power to do so.40 This approach 
maintains separation of powers by ensuring that courts pass judgment, 
and thus run the risk of error, only when they have been given such 
power and only when reaching a judgment on the merits is necessary.41 
Because the judicial power only extends to justiciable cases, rulings in 
                                                     
new circumstances.”). 
34. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
35. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498−99 (1975). 
36. In addition to standing, justiciability doctrines include ripeness, mootness, and the bans on 
deciding political questions and issuing advisory opinions. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 43–172 (5th ed. 2007); FALLON ET AL., supra note 14, at 55–267. 
37. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. 
38. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that separation of powers requires Congress to place limits on the powers it delegates to 
administrative agencies). 
39. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 752 (1984); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United 
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). 
40. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 39–40 (“[T]he principles [of justiciability] are obviously an 
effort to minimize the judicial presence in American public life . . . . [f]or example, a judgment that 
a complex issue is not now ripe for decision may minimize the risk of error and increase the scope 
for continuing democratic deliberation on the problem at hand.”); see also id. at 39 (linking 
minimalism to the “passive virtues” discussed in BICKEL, supra note 1, at 111–98). 
41. See id. at 40. 
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cases where plaintiffs lack standing are illegitimate and undermine the 
judiciary’s stature in a government of separated and enumerated 
powers.42 In disputes involving contentious public rights such as 
religious freedom, standing doctrine prevents federal courts from sailing 
into treacherous political waters without the anchor of a true case or 
controversy.43 Because minimalism seeks to limit the risk of error 
created by judicial involvement in divisive political battles,44 standing 
requirements for Establishment Clause litigation provide fertile ground 
to explore minimalism. 
C.  Stare Decisis Works in Tandem with Minimalism to Limit the Role 
of Federal Courts 
Stare decisis, literally “to stand by things decided,”45 governs the 
continued validity and precedential value of case holdings.46 The Court 
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,47 faced 
with the choice of affirming or overruling the landmark abortion case 
Roe v. Wade,48 discussed the factors that courts must weigh when 
deciding whether to overrule precedent.49 The Court stated that the best 
justification to overrule a precedent is that the precedent has proven 
itself to be so clearly erroneous as to demand its abandonment.50 
Because this situation occurs rarely, courts may consider other factors 
when determining whether to overrule precedent.51 These factors include 
whether the rule set forth in the challenged precedent: (1) defies 
“practical workability,” (2) has been relied upon such that overruling 
would result in hardship, (3) has become a remnant of an abandoned 
doctrine, or (4) relies on outdated facts such that the rule has lost 
“significant application or justification.”52 By limiting the circumstances 
                                                     
42. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 111, 117 (viewing standing as a “passive virtue” that limits 
courts to their legitimate role in a democracy). 
43. Cf. FALLON ET AL., supra note 14, at 127–28. 
44. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 4−5. 
45.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004). 
46. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (affirming the 
“central rule” of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
47. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
48. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
49. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 854−55. 
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under which controlling precedent may be abandoned, stare decisis 
tethers the Court to its prior rulings and constrains the scope of future 
decisions. 
In sum, the doctrines of minimalism, standing, and stare decisis all 
ensure that the judicial branch operates within a limited sphere. 
Minimalist judges limit their rulings to address only what is necessary; 
standing limits courts to hearing only those cases brought by proper 
plaintiffs; stare decisis keeps judges bound to the decisions of prior 
courts.53  
II.  FEDERAL TAXPAYERS HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE 
A NARROW CLASS OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
VIOLATIONS 
Citizens claiming standing based on their status as federal taxpayers 
face an uphill battle in convincing a federal court to adjudicate their 
cases. The Supreme Court has held that taxpayers do not have standing 
to challenge the constitutionality of federal statutes.54 In Flast v. 
Cohen,55 the Court carved out an exception for certain Establishment 
Clause claims.56 In cases subsequent to Flast and preceding Hein, the 
Court clarified and cabined the limits of this exception.57   
A. Taxpayers Generally Do Not Have Standing to Challenge the 
Constitutionality of Federal Statutes 
Standing doctrine requires that a plaintiff bringing a cause of action in 
federal court have suffered a personal injury.58 From time to time, 
federal taxpayers seek to establish standing by framing the injury as the 
                                                     
53. For a discussion of how stare decisis furthers judicial restraint, see Thomas W. Merrill, 
Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 
277– 82 (2005). As discussed at supra note 26, though minimalism differs from judicial restraint, 
the terms are often used interchangeably or used to refer to the same concept of limiting the scope 
of judicial decision-making.  
54. See infra Part II. A. 
55. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
56. See infra Part II.B. 
57. See infra Part II.C. 
58. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
751 (1984). In addition to the injury requirement, there must be a causal link between the plaintiff’s 
injury and the alleged wrongful acts of the defendant, and the remedy sought must redress the 
plaintiff’s injury. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; see also id. at 753 n.19 (clarifying that the causation and 
redressability requirements of standing are distinct and separate requirements). 
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financial injury of paying taxes.59 Although taxpayers have standing to 
challenge the collection of a specific tax on the grounds that the tax itself 
violates a constitutional provision,60 a tougher question emerges when a 
plaintiff asserts standing as a federal taxpayer and the alleged 
unconstitutional act is not the imposition of the tax but rather how the 
taxes are spent. The Supreme Court first ruled on the ability of federal 
taxpayers61 to challenge the constitutionality of federal spending in 
Frothingham v. Mellon.62 
In Frothingham, the plaintiffs challenged a federal appropriations 
statute, the Maternity Act of 1921,63 on the ground that the statute 
invaded state sovereignty,64 thus violating the Tenth Amendment.65 Mrs. 
Frothingham argued, in effect, that she had standing as a federal 
taxpayer because the allegedly unconstitutional spending for the 
Maternity Act increased her tax burden without due process of law.66 
The Court rejected this argument, declaring that an individual taxpayer 
has so minute an interest in the pool of federal tax funds that there is no 
individualized interest or injury; therefore, Mrs. Frothingham did not 
                                                     
59.  See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood) Standing 
Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 771–73 (2003) (citing various taxpayer standing lawsuits).  
60. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. ___ (June 25, 2007), 127 S. Ct. 2553, 
2563 (2007) (plurality opinion) (citing Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944)). Follett 
involved a prosecution for selling books without a locally required license. Follett, 321 U.S. at 574. 
The defendant there was a Jehovah’s Witness who challenged the license statute as violating his 
right to free exercise of religion. Id. The Supreme Court held that the license fee amounted to an 
unconstitutional tax on constitutionally protected religious activity. Id. at 577. 
61. For a thorough exploration of the history of state and municipal taxpayer standing in federal 
court, see generally Staudt, supra note 59. As Professor Staudt notes, whether state and municipal 
taxpayers have standing to sue in state courts presents a different question governed by state law 
and not subject to federal standing doctrine. Id. at 775. The contours of state and municipal taxpayer 
standing, both in federal and in state courts, are beyond the scope of this Note. 
62. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923) (decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon). 
Although Mrs. Frothingham claimed standing as a federal taxpayer, Massachusetts challenged the 
federal appropriations statute as a violation of its sovereignty over state affairs. Id. at 480. The Court 
dismissed both cases on justiciability grounds. Id. (“We have reached the conclusion that the cases 
must be disposed of for want of jurisdiction without considering the merits of the constitutional 
questions.”). Although the term “standing” had not yet been widely adopted to refer to these types 
of justiciability issues, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 14, at 126 n.1, this Note will use the term 
“standing” for clarity. 
63. 42 Stat. 224, 224–26 (1921), 42 U.S.C. §§ 161–175 (1925) (repealed 1929). The Act 
“provided federal financial support for state programs to reduce maternal and infant mortality . . . .” 
FALLON ET AL., supra note 14, at 127. 
64. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 479.  
65. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
66. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486. 
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have standing to bring her claim in federal court.67 Instead, the Court 
characterized an individual taxpayer’s injury as one suffered in common 
with people generally.68 Additionally, the Court reasoned that the 
judiciary has no power to rule on the validity of congressional acts in a 
vacuum and thus, when a taxpayer seeks a judicial remedy, the taxpayer 
must show “not only that the statute is invalid but [also] that [the party] 
has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct 
injury as a result of its enforcement.”69 Consequently, an injury suffered 
“in some indefinite way in common with people generally” cannot 
support a valid case or controversy.70 
In a subsequent state taxpayer standing case, the Court further 
expounded on the limitations of taxpayer injury.71 In Doremus v. Board 
of Education of the Borough of Hawthorne,72 the plaintiffs challenged 
the practice of teachers reciting Bible verses in New Jersey public 
schools73 under the Establishment Clause,74 claiming standing as state 
and municipal taxpayers.75 The Court declined to review the state court’s 
decision, holding that the plaintiffs had no standing in federal court.76 In 
addressing the issue of taxpayer injury, the Court quoted favorably from 
the state high court ruling that the brief recitation from the Old 
                                                     
67. Id. at 487. 
68. Id. at 488–89. Such injuries are known as generalized grievances. See, e.g., William A. 
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988) (“If a plaintiff can show 
sufficient injury to satisfy Article III, he must also satisfy prudential concerns about, for 
example . . . whether he should be able to litigate generalized social grievances.”). 
69.  Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 488. 
70. Id. But see Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19, 21, 23−24 (1998) (holding that 
when a statute grants a cause of action to any person “aggrieved” by an action of the Federal 
Election Commission, an aggrieved plaintiff has standing if the injury is “concrete” even if it is one 
shared by many others). 
71. Although the plaintiffs brought suit in state court claiming standing as state taxpayers, the 
Supreme Court reviewed the case because the complaint alleged violations of the Establishment 
Clause. Doremus v. Board of Educ. of the Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 430, 432 (1952).  
72. 342 U.S. 429 (1952). 
73. Id. at 430. 
74. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. 
75. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 432. One plaintiff also claimed standing as a parent of a child subject to 
the challenged law, but the Court dismissed this as moot because the child had already graduated. 
Id. at 432–33. 
76. Id. at 435. Cf. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618 (1989) (holding that only the party 
seeking Supreme Court review of an adverse state court ruling need satisfy federal standing 
requirements); id. at 623 n.2 (distinguishing Doremus, where the original state court plaintiff sought 
Supreme Court review, from ASARCO, where the original state court defendant-intervenors sought 
Supreme Court review).  
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Testament each morning added no additional cost to the schools’ 
operational budget.77 Because the school day lasts a fixed period of time, 
the cost of teacher salaries does not change based on lesson content or 
classroom speech.78 While the plaintiffs claimed taxpayer injury, there 
was no specific appropriation of funds and therefore no taxpayer 
standing.79 Despite being a state taxpayer standing case, Doremus is 
significant to the federal taxpayer standing doctrine because of this last 
distinction: federal taxpayer standing, if it can exist at all, must be linked 
to a specific expenditure of funds supporting the challenged activity.80 
B. Flast v. Cohen Created a Narrow Exception That Permits Federal 
Taxpayer Standing Under Certain Circumstances 
Forty-five years after Frothingham, the Supreme Court carved out a 
narrow exception to the general ban on federal taxpayer standing.81 Flast 
v. Cohen presented an Establishment Clause challenge to the Secondary 
Education Act of 196582 on the ground that the Act authorized states to 
give federal education funds to private schools.83 The plaintiffs claimed 
standing as taxpayers and specifically challenged the use of federal tax 
dollars84 to support religious institutions, characterizing such actions as 
“compulsory taxation for religious purposes.”85 The Court held that a 
federal taxpayer can have standing to challenge a federal statute by 
showing a “logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim 
sought to be adjudicated.”86 
                                                     
77. Id. at 431 (quoting Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Hawthorne, 75 A.2d 880, 881−82 
(N.J. 1950)). 
78.  See id.  
79. Id. at 434−35. 
80. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968). 
81. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988) (explaining Flast’s holding). 
82. 79 Stat. 27, 27–58 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 241a (Supp. I 1965) (repealed 1978).  
83. Flast, 392 U.S. at 85−86. While the Act only referred to private schools generally and did not 
mention private religious schools, during the 1960s the vast majority of private schools were 
religiously affiliated. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. ___ (June 25, 2007), 
127 S. Ct. 2553, 2565 n.3 (2007) (plurality opinion). 
84. Justice Harlan argued that tax dollars become general funds and lose their identity as tax 
dollars once collected, and thus the plaintiffs challenged the use of general funds rather than tax 
dollars. Flast, 392 U.S. at 128 (dissenting opinion). 
85. Id. at 87. 
86. Id. at 102. 
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According to Flast, the analysis of whether the required nexus 
between federal taxpayer status and the claim to be adjudicated exists 
has two parts.87 First, a taxpayer may only challenge federal statutes 
passed under the taxing and spending power88 so long as the spending is 
not “incidental” to administering “an essentially regulatory statute.”89 
The Court noted that Congress appropriated almost one billion dollars to 
implement the Secondary Education Act in 196590 and referred to this 
amount as “substantial,”91 but Flast’s holding did not explicitly require 
that any minimum amount be spent.92 Second, the challenge must be 
based on a specific constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending 
power.93 The Court held that the Establishment Clause imposes a 
limitation on the taxing and spending power, but did not decide whether 
any other constitutional provisions impose a similar limitation.94 
C. Later Cases Further Narrowed the Flast Exception 
In fact, the Court has never found any additional constitutional 
provisions that directly limit the taxing and spending power.95 A few 
years after Flast, two cases denied taxpayer standing for alleged 
                                                     
87. Id. 
88. Id. The Constitution grants Congress the power to tax and spend. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
89. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102 (citing Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Hawthorne, 342 
U.S. 429 (1952)). This restriction means that to pass the first part of the nexus test, Congress must 
have allocated money to be spent on the challenged statutory program. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 
U.S. 589, 619 (“We do not think, however, that appellees’ claim that [statutory] funds are being 
used improperly by individual grantees is any less a challenge to congressional taxing and spending 
power simply because the funding authorized by Congress has flowed through and been 
administered by the Secretary.”). Similar to Doremus, a taxpayer would fail the first part of the 
nexus test if the challenged statute dictated that a federal employee perform allegedly 
unconstitutional activities in the course of employment without providing any additional funding for 
these new activities. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 102; Doremus, 342 U.S. at 431. 
90. Flast, 392 U.S. at 103 n.23. 
91. Id. at 103. 
92. See id. at 105−06. Indeed, the Court seemed to imply that any amount spent would be 
sufficient as long as the spending was not incidental to a regulatory scheme as discussed in supra 
note 89. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 103−04 (citing 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 186 (Hunt ed. 
1901)). 
93. Id. at 102−03. 
94. Id. at 105. 
95. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 508 n.18 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In the years since the announcement of 
the Flast test we have yet to recognize a similar restriction on Congress’ power to tax, and I know 
of none.”). 
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violations of other constitutional provisions.96 The Court recently denied 
standing to a state taxpayer challenging an alleged Dormant Commerce 
Clause violation.97 Although the Court in Flast left open the possibility 
that other constitutional provisions could pass the second part of the 
nexus test,98 Flast’s holding has effectively been confined to 
Establishment Clause challenges.99 Contrary to Justice Douglas’s 
prediction that Flast’s narrow holding would expand and lead to the 
gradual erosion of Frothingham,100 later decisions have done just the 
opposite: narrowed Flast and reinforced Frothingham. 
Even within Flast’s accepted domain, the Establishment Clause, the 
Court has applied Flast narrowly. Faced with a federal taxpayer 
challenge to a federal government transfer of a surplus World War II 
military hospital to a religious school, the Court declined to grant 
standing under Flast.101 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 
United for Separations of Church and State102 distinguished Flast on 
two grounds: first, that the transfer of property was a discretionary 
decision of an executive agency, rather than congressional action;103 
second, that Congress authorized this kind of transfer under the Property 
Clause,104 rather than the taxing and spending power.105 As the Court 
suggested,106 these two distinctions are really manifestations of the same 
underlying issue: the challenged action in Valley Forge did not actually 
involve any spending.107 Valley Forge reiterates that Flast only allows 
                                                     
96. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974) (denying 
taxpayer standing to challenge Members of Congress serving in the Army Reserve as against the 
Incompatibility Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 
175 (1974) (denying taxpayer standing to challenge the Central Intelligence Agency’s refusal to 
publish detailed records as allegedly required by the Accounts Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7). 
97. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 338, 346 (2006) (rejecting state taxpayer 
standing to bring a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to franchise tax credits designed to 
persuade DaimlerChrysler not to move a factory out of state). 
98. Flast, 392 U.S. at 105−06. 
99. See DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. at 347. 
100. Flast, 392 U.S. at 107 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
101. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 467−68, 482 (1982). 
102. 454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
103. Id. at 479. 
104. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
105. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 480. 
106. Id. (“Secondly, and perhaps redundantly . . . .”). 
107. Id. at 480 n.17; see also Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. ___ (June 
25, 2007), 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2586–87 n.2 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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standing to challenge congressional spending that allegedly violates the 
Establishment Clause.108 
Valley Forge suggests that an executive agency’s discretionary acts 
fail the first part of the Flast nexus test simply because the Executive 
Branch, rather than the Legislative Branch, has performed the 
challenged action.109 The Court later clarified, however, that once 
Congress has authorized spending to administer a statute, the fact that an 
executive agency chose to spend the appropriated funds in violation of 
the Establishment Clause will not preclude taxpayer standing.110 Bowen 
v. Kendrick111 allowed standing for an as-applied challenge to the 
Adolescent Family Life Act112 based on grants given to religious 
organizations at the discretion of the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services.113 The Court held that this challenge passed the first part of the 
Flast nexus test because the Secretary administered the spending of 
funds approved by Congress.114 Thus clarifying the issue left open in 
Valley Forge, Bowen allowed standing under Flast for challenges to 
executive administration of federal statutes.115 
In sum, the Court has fashioned and maintained a narrow exception to 
the general ban on taxpayer standing.116 Recognizing the sound policy of 
Frothingham’s ban on generalized grievances, the Court has applied 
Flast’s two-part nexus test strictly.117 The Court did not revisit this line 
of cases until Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. during 
the 2006 Term.118 
                                                     
108. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 479. 
109. See id. 
110. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 619−20 (1988). 
111. 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
112. 42 U.S.C. § 300z to z-10 (1982 & Supp. II 1985). The Act set a regulatory structure for 
giving grants to groups focused on teenage sexual activity and pregnancy. Id. 
113. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 593, 618. 
114. Id. at 619. 
115. See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. ___ (June 25, 2007), 127 S. Ct. 
2553, 2567 (2007); Bowen, 487 U.S. at 619–20.   
116. For discussion of minimalist nature of this narrow exception, see infra Part IV.A. 
117. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968) (“We lack that confidence [to allow 
taxpayer standing] in cases such as Frothingham where a taxpayer seeks to employ a federal court 
as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the 
allocation of power in the Federal System.”). 
118. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2561−62. 
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III.  THE COURT IN HEIN DISAGREED ABOUT THE VALIDITY 
AND APPLICATION OF FLAST 
The Court in Hein issued four separate opinions. Justice Alito wrote 
the plurality opinion, which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy 
joined. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion expands on separation of 
powers issues. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the 
judgment but substantially disagreed with the plurality’s reasoning. 
Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer. The first section of Part III of this Note discusses the facts and 
procedural history of the litigation leading to the Court’s opinions. The 
rest of Part III explores the reasoning of each opinion. 
A. Hein Challenged Certain Aspects of President Bush’s Faith-Based 
Initiatives 
In Hein, the Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. (FFRF) 
challenged both the constitutionality of conferences designed to train 
religious groups on how to successfully apply for federal aid, and the 
religiously themed speeches given at these conferences by President 
George W. Bush and other executive officers.119 The litigation grew out 
of an Executive Order120 that created the Office of Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives (OFBCI) within the Executive Office of the 
President.121 The Order charged OFBCI with ensuring that religious 
groups providing community services could compete on an equal 
playing field with secular groups providing similar services when 
applying for federal aid.122 Congress did not create the OFBCI, and 
funding came from general Executive Branch funds rather than specific 
congressional appropriations.123 
FFRF claimed taxpayer standing under Flast as its sole basis for 
standing in federal court.124 The district court dismissed the case for lack 
of standing because FFRF did not challenge an exercise of congressional 
                                                     
119. Id. at 2559. 
120. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 3 C.F.R. 752 (2001), reprinted in 3 U.S.C.A. ch. 2 annots., at 451–
52 (2005). 
121. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2559. 
122. Id. at 2559−60 (citing 3 C.F.R. 752–753). 
123. Id. at 2560. 
124. Id. at 2561.   
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power.125 On appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, a divided 
panel reversed the district court ruling, holding that Flast allows 
standing to challenge government actions “financed by a congressional 
appropriation,” even if the spending was not pursuant to any statutory 
program.126 One judge dissented from the panel decision, warning that 
the Court of Appeals’ holding threatened to broaden standing under 
Flast.127 The Court of Appeals then denied rehearing en banc, and a 
concurring opinion suggested that the Supreme Court needed to resolve 
the issue.128 The Court granted certiorari to resolve this dispute.129 
The Court divided sharply, issuing four separate opinions: (1) Justice 
Alito’s plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Kennedy;130 (2) Justice Kennedy’s concurrence;131 (3) Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence in the judgment and disagreement with the plurality’s 
reasoning, joined by Justice Thomas;132 and (4) the dissenting opinion of 
the remaining four Justices, who would have found standing.133 When no 
opinion commands the support of five Justices, the narrowest opinion 
that concurs in the judgment controls the case.134 As discussed below, 
because the plurality opinion expressed the narrowest grounds leading to 
reversal of the Court of Appeals, Justice Alito’s opinion controls.135 
                                                     
125. Id. 
126. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d 
sub nom., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. ___ (June 25, 2007), 127 S. Ct. 
2553, 2559 (2007)). 
127. Chao, 433 F.3d at 997−98, 1000 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
128. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988, 988 (7th Cir. 2006) (Flaum, 
C.J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 989 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in the 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
129. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2561−62. 
130. Id. at 2559. 
131. Id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
132. Id. at 2573 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
133. Id. at 2584 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
134. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977); see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, 
Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation and the Future of Establishment 
Clause Adjudication, 2008 BYU L. REV 115, 130 (2008) (noting that Marks sets the standard for 
determining the controlling opinion when no majority of the court joins a single opinion). 
135. See Marks, 430 U.S. at 193; Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2584 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing 
Justice Alito’s opinion as controlling without explicitly stating why or citing Marks); see also Lupu, 
supra note 134, at 130, 130 n.80 (discussing whether Justice Alito’s or Justice Kennedy’s is the most 
narrow, but suggesting that it “may not make any tangible difference in the outcome of future cases 
in the lower courts”). 
MCNAMARA_FINAL_2.DOC 6/10/2008 5:52:02 PM 
Forceful Minimalism 
303 
B. Justice Alito Denied Standing by Distinguishing Precedent in His 
Plurality Opinion 
The plurality embraced the narrowness of Flast and its progeny, 
especially Valley Forge, and applied the “Flast exception” with 
“rigor.”136 In so doing, the plurality described Flast as a case involving 
specific and direct congressional spending alleged to violate the 
Establishment Clause.137 Focusing on the first part of the nexus test, the 
plurality found the link between congressional action and the challenged 
executive acts too attenuated to support standing.138 While Bowen 
allowed a challenge to the administration of a congressional statute that 
was left to the discretion of an executive agency, the plurality 
distinguished Bowen as only applying to the administration of federal 
statutes.139 Key to this conclusion was the plurality’s observation that 
FFRF “can cite no statute whose application they challenge.”140 Even 
though Congress had allocated funds for the operation of executive 
agencies and those funds were used to pay for the conferences at issue, 
Congress had played no role in the creation of the OFBCI and had 
imposed no restrictions on the use of these operational funds.141 
Therefore, because FFRF had no congressional action to challenge, there 
was no nexus between FFRF’s taxpayer injury and Congress’s use of the 
taxing and spending power.142 
Where FFRF claimed that distinguishing between legislative and 
executive acts that violate the Establishment Clause did not make sense, 
the plurality explained that “Flast focused on congressional action, and 
we must decline this invitation to extend its holding to encompass 
discretionary Executive Branch expenditures.”143 The plurality viewed 
Flast as creating a narrow exception limited to a small range of 
situations, and thus followed past precedent, which had refused to apply 
                                                     
136. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2565 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation 
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 481 (1982)). 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 2568. 
139. Id. at 2567. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. See also id. at 2568 n.7 (“Nor is it relevant that Congress may have informally 
‘earmarked’ portions of its general Executive Branch appropriations to fund the offices and centers 
whose expenditures are at issue here.”). 
142. Id. at 2568. 
143. Id. 
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the Flast exception to other situations.144 Separation of powers concerns 
informed the decision to keep Flast confined to congressional statutes.145 
Specifically, the Court reasoned that allowing standing to challenge the 
vast range of executive activities funded through general operating 
budgets any time a taxpayer alleges an Establishment Clause violation 
would seriously aggrandize the power of the judiciary at the expense of 
the executive.146 
In response to the charge that immunizing the executive from the type 
of review Flast imposes upon Congress would give agencies a loophole 
to exploit, the plurality suggested that Congress could stop such abuse 
through statute.147 Also, the plurality reasoned that egregious 
Establishment Clause violations often produce injuries more 
particularized than taxpayer injury, and these injuries would support 
standing outside the context of Flast.148 Ultimately, the plurality viewed 
its ruling as a narrow resolution of the case at hand.149 Seeing no 
justification for expanding Flast and no need to overrule it, Justice Alito 
declared, “[w]e leave Flast as we found it.”150 
C. Justice Kennedy Explained in His Concurring Opinion Why Hein 
Is Distinguishable from Flast 
Although he joined the plurality “in full,” Justice Kennedy wrote 
separately to explain his views on separation of powers and Flast.151 
Justice Kennedy agreed that Flast should not support standing in this 
case, based on concerns over separation of powers.152 Fearing “judicial 
oversight of executive duties,” he stated that allowing standing for this 
                                                     
144. Id. at 2568−69. 
145. Id. at 2569–70. 
146. Id. at 2569−70. 
147. Id. at 2571. 
148. Id. For illustrations of such injuries, see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 584 (1992) 
(recognizing a student’s injury for being subjected to school-sponsored prayer at a graduation 
ceremony rather than relying on taxpayer standing); cf. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. 
Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d sub nom., Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572 (plurality 
opinion) (“No doubt so elaborate, so public, a subvention of religion [as a government official 
building a mosque with federal funds] would give rise to standing to sue on other grounds [besides 
taxpayer standing].”). 
149. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572. 
150. Id. at 2571−72. 
151. Id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
152. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572. 
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type of case would cast the courts in the “role of speech editors . . . and 
event planners” for the Executive Branch.153 Mindful of the potential for 
abuse in situations where plaintiffs will have a hard time gaining 
standing to challenge the Executive Branch, Justice Kennedy stated that 
government officials must “conform their actions” to the Constitution.154 
Regarding Flast’s validity, Justice Kennedy gave Flast a much 
warmer embrace than the plurality, declaring that “the result reached in 
Flast is correct and should not be called into question.”155 On the one 
hand, discussion of the soundness of Flast’s holding as a policy matter, 
being unnecessary to the plurality’s conclusion, reaches more broadly 
and should not be controlling.156 Yet, when combined with the four 
dissenting Justices that clearly support Flast, Justice Kennedy’s view 
commands a majority of the Court in this respect and could be viewed as 
a controlling statement.157 
D. Justice Scalia Urged Broadly Overruling Flast 
In stark contrast to the plurality’s minimalism, Justice Scalia’s 
opinion called for a complete reversal of Flast on all grounds, regardless 
of the case at hand.158 Justice Scalia portrayed the taxpayer injury in 
cases like Flast as a “Psychic Injury” and questioned why such mental 
injuries should ever support standing.159 Calling Flast and the cases 
following it a “jurisprudential disaster,”160 Justice Scalia argued that 
overruling was the only principled approach.161 This opinion attacked 
the plurality’s minimalist approach for being based on meaningless 
                                                     
153. Id. at 2572−73. 
154. Id. at 2573. 
155. Id. 
156. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
157. Cf. Lupu, supra note 134, at 130 (suggesting that Justice Kennedy’s opinion may be more 
narrow because it is “more respectful of the pre-existing law,” thus supporting the inference that 
five Justices agree that Flast is good law). 
158. Id. at 2573−74 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
159. Id. at 2574−75. Use of the term “Psychic Injury” leads to confusion, because some “psychic” 
injuries, like infliction of mental distress, are sufficient for standing, while “ideological” injuries 
generally are not. See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” 
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 188−89 (1992). 
160. For a previous “jurisprudential disaster,” see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Lee recognized religious “coercion” as an Establishment Clause violation. 
Id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
161. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2584. 
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distinctions used to distinguish past precedent.162 Thus, Justice Scalia 
argued that Doremus cannot be reconciled with Flast163 and that more 
generally, Flast is inconsistent with the constitutional limits on standing 
described in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife164 because taxpayer injury 
can never be an injury in fact.165 
E. Justice Souter Argued in His Dissenting Opinion That Hein and 
Flast Present the Same Injury 
In his dissent, Justice Souter argued that the injury to taxpayers is the 
same whether Congress or the Executive Branch spends the funds, and 
thus, that standing should exist for both types of claims.166 Rather than 
reading Flast narrowly to allow standing only to challenge spending 
pursuant to a congressional mandate, the dissent read Flast to apply 
logically no matter which branch of the government spent the funds.167 
The dissent also recognized the distinction between Flast and Doremus, 
but suggested that because identifiable amounts of federal funds 
financed the challenged conferences, Doremus did not preclude standing 
for FFRF.168 Addressing separation of powers, the dissent argued that 
Flast already allowed federal court plaintiffs to challenge these types of 
congressional spending decisions and that the Executive Branch should 
receive no more insulation from these lawsuits than Congress.169 Finally, 
regarding the plurality’s distinguishing of Bowen, Justice Souter saw no 
difference between discretion in the administration of a statute and 
discretion outside the administration of a statute.170 
IV. HEIN EXEMPLIFIES THE PROPER ROLE OF MINIMALISM 
IN JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 
Having explored the foundation of Establishment Clause taxpayer 
standing and having surveyed the various opinions in Hein, the question 
                                                     
162. Id. at 2582. 
163. Id. at 2577. 
164. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
165. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2574. 
166. Id. at 2584−85 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
167. Id. 
168. See id. at 2585. 
169. Id. at 2586. 
170. Id. 
MCNAMARA_FINAL_2.DOC 6/10/2008 5:52:02 PM 
Forceful Minimalism 
307 
remains whether minimalism makes sense in the context of taxpayer 
standing doctrine. By “not doing”171 the deathblow to Flast and instead 
doing only what was necessary to resolve the case at hand, the plurality 
avoided issuing a broad ruling that would reach too far. Of the 
competing opinions in Hein, the plurality opinion is the most consistent 
with the values of minimalism and the limited role of federal courts. 
This Part argues first that the Establishment Clause exception for 
taxpayer standing is itself a minimalist doctrine intended to allow 
standing in a narrow range of cases without allowing the exception to 
swallow the rule against taxpayer standing. The minimalist nature of 
Flast supports the minimalist solution in Hein. Second, Flast is 
consistent with other standing decisions. Third, under the Casey factors, 
there is a lack of compelling reasons to abandon the Establishment 
Clause taxpayer standing doctrine that Flast v. Cohen created, 
supporting the plurality’s minimalist solution in Hein. Fourth, the 
potential negative effects of the plurality’s narrow ruling are speculative 
and should be left for later resolution if the need arises. Finally, some 
situations demand broader rulings, providing limits to the usefulness of 
minimalism. 
A. Flast Created a Minimalist Doctrine 
The Court’s narrow holding in Flast, which created the two-part 
nexus test as a limited exception to the general ban on federal taxpayer 
standing, exhibits many minimalist qualities. Most significantly, the 
Court could have overruled Frothingham and opened up a vast realm of 
taxpayer standing, as indeed one member of the Court advocated.172 
Instead, the Court distinguished Frothingham as failing the second part 
of the nexus test because the constitutional provisions invoked by the 
Frothingham plaintiffs173 did not impose limitations on the taxing and 
                                                     
171. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 71. 
172. Flast, 392 U.S. at 107 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that the narrow exception 
will slowly get larger and erode Frothingham and that the Court should overrule Frothingham). The 
majority viewed Frothingham favorably and fashioned the exception in Flast very narrowly to 
preserve Frothingham in most situations. See id. at 106 (majority opinion) (“We lack that 
confidence [to allow taxpayer standing] in cases such as Frothingham where a taxpayer seeks to 
employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of 
government or the allocation of power in the Federal System.”). 
173. The plaintiffs relied on the Tenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479−80 (1923). 
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spending power.174 While Frothingham broadly banned federal taxpayer 
standing,175 Flast gave Frothingham a narrower scope.176 Even more 
minimally, the Court in Flast declined to name any constitutional 
provisions other than the Establishment Clause that limit Congress’s 
taxing and spending power.177 The Court went only as far as necessary, 
leaving the evaluation of other constitutional provisions to “the context 
of future cases.”178 By creating a narrow exception with a minimal 
scope, the Court ensured that Flast’s limited exception would not 
become a large one that would lead to the abandonment of the principles 
underlying the general rule of Frothingham.179 Subsequent cases have 
clarified and limited Flast, maintaining the minimalist nature of the 
Establishment Clause taxpayer standing doctrine.180 
B.  Flast Is Consistent with Standing Doctrine Generally 
Flast has not been overruled by the constitutionalization of 
standing.181 In his opinion, Justice Scalia argued that Flast improperly 
allows standing without any particularized injury,182 but Federal 
Election Commission v. Akins183 suggests that taxpayer injury can be a 
valid injury for standing purposes.184 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife held 
                                                     
174. Flast, 392 U.S. at 105. 
175. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487. 
176. Flast, 392 U.S. at 105. However, because the Flast exception to Frothingham is quite 
narrow, Frothingham only went from being always applicable to almost always applicable. See 
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. ___ (June 25, 2007), 127 S. Ct. 2553, 
2564−65 (2007) (plurality opinion); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173 (1974). 
177. Flast, 392 U.S. at 105. 
178. Id. 
179. See supra Part II. 
180. See supra Part II.C.  
181. By “constitutionalization of standing” I mean post-Flast cases that define standing as having 
an “irreducible constitutional minimum.” See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560 (1992) (collecting and summarizing prior cases fleshing out the injury, traceability, and 
redressability requirements that the Court has created based on Article III); see also Myriam E. 
Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 
CAL. L. REV. 315, 329 (2001) (“[The Lujan majority] began by explicitly recognizing [the Court’s] 
gradual constitutionalization of standing doctrine.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, 
Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 
23 (1984) (referring to the “constitutionalization of remedial standing”). 
182. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2582−83 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
183. 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
184. See id. at 24 (“Often the fact that an interest is abstract and the fact that it is widely shared 
go hand in hand. But their association is not invariable, and where a harm is concrete, though 
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that the Constitution requires a plaintiff to claim a valid injury to have 
standing to sue in federal court.185 Defining what constitutes a valid 
injury, however, involves prudential decisions by the Court rather than 
clear constitutional directives.186 Thus, consistent with Lujan and 
constitutional standing doctrine, the Court can declare certain injuries as 
valid for standing purposes, as in fact the Court has done in cases such 
as Flast and Akins. 
Justice Scalia also argued in his Hein concurrence that Flast 
fashioned its two-part nexus to circumvent prior precedent.187 But, 
Doremus and Flast have managed to coexist based on the distinction 
between statutes that command certain behavior and statutes that create 
spending programs.188 In the former case, Congress has not invoked the 
power to tax and spend, while in the latter case, it has.189 Though almost 
all government action involves some expenditure of funds,190 there is a 
meaningful difference between spending incidental to regulatory 
activity191 and spending pursuant to a statutory mandate.192 Invoking the 
power to tax and spend in violation of a specific constitutional limitation 
on that power is what underlies the Flast nexus test. Similar to Doremus, 
in Hein, FFRF lacked standing because it did not challenge an exercise 
of the taxing and spending power.193 While Justice Scalia did not accept 
such a distinction, the plurality did, and thus the plurality could deny 
                                                     
widely shared, the Court has found injury in fact.”) (citations omitted); see also Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 
2587 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Akins to suggest the harm in Hein was concrete and widely 
shared). 
185. 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
186. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“It does not, however, 
follow that suits brought by [plaintiffs claiming non-standard injuries] are excluded by the ‘case or 
controversy’ clause of Article III of the Constitution from the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”); cf. 
Sunstein, supra note 159, at 190 (“[W]hether there is a so-called nonjusticiable ideological interest, 
or instead a legally cognizable ‘actual injury,’ is a product of legal conventions and nothing else.”); 
Fletcher, supra note 68, at 232 (“A statement that a plaintiff . . . suffered no ‘injury in fact’ [is] 
based on some normative judgment about what ought to constitute a judicially cognizable 
injury . . . [and] not whether an actual injury occurred.”). 
187. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2577 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the first prong 
of the nexus test circumvents Doremus, and the second prong does the same with Frothingham). 
188. See supra note 89. 
189. See id. 
190. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2569 (plurality opinion). 
191. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 102 (1968). 
192. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 619−20 (1988). 
193. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568. 
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standing without having to overrule any precedent.194 Such an approach 
avoids a broad ruling and potential “jurisprudential disasters”195 that 
might otherwise follow, choosing instead to confront such “disasters” 
when they materialize. 
C. Overruling Flast at This Time Is Inconsistent with Stare Decisis 
By arguing to overrule Flast, Justice Scalia advocated abandoning the 
continued reliance on Flast as precedent. Although the Court did not 
need to overrule Flast to reach its judgment in Hein, Justice Scalia, in 
his opinion concurring in the judgment, posed the question of whether 
Flast merits continued adherence. This section weighs the factors 
discussed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey196 that provide guidance when deciding whether to overrule 
precedent. 
Although the Court has essentially limited Flast to its facts,197 the 
principles of stare decisis discussed in Casey do not support its 
abrogation.198 Regarding the first Casey factor—practical workability—
Flast, Valley Forge, Bowen, and Hein demonstrate that taxpayer 
standing doctrine is capable of working in practice.199 Second, although 
Flast arguably may not have created a strong reliance interest for 
plaintiffs because “one does not arrange his affairs with an eye to 
standing,”200 a precedent should not be overruled simply because few 
will mourn its passing.201 A lack of reliance reduces the consequences of 
overruling a precedent but does not provide a principled reason for 
abandoning settled law.202 Third, Flast is not a remnant of an abandoned 
                                                     
194. Compare id. at 2577 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) with id. at 2568 (plurality 
opinion). 
195. See supra note 160. 
196. 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992). 
197. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568−69. 
198. For a discussion of the Casey factors, see supra Part I.C.   
199. Compare Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 
Inc., 509 F.3d 406, 420 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying Hein to find taxpayer standing based on specific 
appropriations by the Iowa legislature) with Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2584 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
judgment) and Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988, 989−90 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(Easterbrook, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (stating there is “no logical way to 
determine the extent of an arbitrary rule”). 
200. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2584 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
201. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (suggesting that there needs to be a 
compelling justification to overrule a precedent). 
202. Cf. id.; Casey, 505 U.S. at 855–56 (discussing the reliance interest of precedent).  
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doctrine no matter how one frames the relevant doctrine.203 Finally, 
Flast does not rely on such outdated facts that it has lost “significant 
application or justification.”204 Even if Hein presents weak facts, the 
underlying system of faith-based initiatives presents live constitutional 
issues without easy resolution.205 
Justice Scalia may disagree with the Court that taxpayers suffer a 
judicially cognizable injury, but the doctrine of stare decisis does not 
allow overruling precedent just because the Court might have ruled on 
this issue differently from the way the Court ruled in Flast.206 Because 
Flast fits within the broad and varied umbrella of standing doctrine, 
Flast remains a vital part of a living doctrine and should not be 
overruled, even if the Court were forced to decide that question. While 
future development of the law may eventually render Flast an 
anachronism, minimalism demands that overruling wait until the arrival 
of these future developments.207 
D. Potential Abuses of Loopholes Created by Hein Should Be 
Adjudicated When and if They Arise 
Because minimalism seeks to reduce the risk and limit the scope of 
judicial error,208 the plurality opinion’s success depends upon the 
potential negative consequences it might create. Justice Souter argued in 
his dissent that the plurality’s distinction between legislative and 
executive action creates an improper disparity in taxpayer standing 
doctrine that could lead to abuse by creative executive agencies.209 
Justice Scalia went even further, suggesting some ways such abuse could 
                                                     
203. If the doctrine at issue is taxpayer standing generally, then Flast is a narrowly carved 
exception to the general doctrine banning taxpayer standing. See supra Part II. Instead, if the 
relevant doctrine is Establishment Clause taxpayer standing, that doctrine has at least some life, as 
evidenced by its continued litigation. See, e.g., Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. 
Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc., 509 F.3d 406, 420 (8th Cir. 2007) (recognizing taxpayer standing 
for a challenge to prison religious programs). Likewise, if standing doctrine itself is the relevant 
issue, this doctrine too has not been abandoned. See supra Part II. 
204. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992). 
205. See, e.g., Equal Treatment in Dep’t of Labor Programs for Faith-Based & Cmty. Orgs., 69 
Fed. Reg. 41,882, 41,884−86 (July 12, 2004) (responding to public commentary about the proposed 
rule through extensive legal argument about the rule’s constitutionality). 
206. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at  443. 
207. Cf. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. ___ (June 25, 2007), 127 S. Ct. 
2553, 2571−72 (2007) (leaving hypothetical cases to be resolved only if they become actual cases). 
208. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 46. 
209. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2586 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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occur.210 For example, Congress could try to immunize an agency from 
taxpayer challenges either by allocating generic operational funds or by 
expressly limiting the use of funds to programs that comply with the 
Establishment Clause.211 Although the former might be more effective 
than the latter under Hein,212 both involve spending pursuant to a federal 
statute. Bowen suggests, and Hein seems to reinforce, that as long as 
Congress creates the specific spending program at issue, the nexus will 
exist to support taxpayer standing.213 
Ultimately, these concerns do not amount to much.214 Speculating 
about these concerns presents a deeper problem: this involves extended 
hypothesizing about facts not before the Court. While judges naturally 
consider the future effects of their rulings, minimalists decide one case at 
a time and reconcile previous rulings with the unique facts of later cases 
as they arise.215 When litigants in subsequent cases argue for precedent 
to be applied in ways that reach questionable results, courts can modify 
the doctrine at issue to avoid such problems.216 This is exactly what the 
plurality did in Hein: it declined to extend Flast outside the realm of 
congressional action.217 Once the hypothetical abuses imagined by 
Justices Scalia and Souter come before the Court, if they ever do come 
                                                     
210. Id. at 2580 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
211. Id. 
212. The former example at least leaves the choice of how to spend the appropriated funds to 
executive discretion, thus minimizing congressional involvement in the way the funds are spent. 
The latter example involves more congressional involvement, and thus more of a nexus. But see id. 
at 2580 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the plurality’s reasoning would allow 
Congress to immunize executive action from suit simply by “codifying the truism that no 
appropriation can be spent by the Executive Branch in a manner that violates the Establishment 
Clause.”). 
213. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2567 (plurality opinion); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 619−20 
(1988); cf. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568 (suggesting that a congressional statute creating the spending 
program is prerequisite to standing under Flast). 
214. Compare Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2586 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the executive can 
now “accomplish through the exercise of discretion exactly what Congress cannot do through 
legislation”) with id. at 2571 (plurality opinion) (noting that egregious actions like using 
“discretionary funds to build a house of worship” are both unlikely and remediable without taxpayer 
standing). It is worth noting, however, that President Bush only created the OFBCI through 
Executive Order after legislative attempts stalled in Congress. See Lupu, supra note 135, at 48−49. 
Had Congress created the OFBCI through statute, FFRF might well have had standing under Flast. 
Id. 
215. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 44. 
216. Id. at 44−45. 
217. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2571. 
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before the Court,218 the Court can, with the benefit of fully developed 
facts, evaluate whether to modify taxpayer standing doctrine to address 
such abuse.219 The minimalist judge leaves such thorny issues for later 
resolution, addressing them only if facts arise that require facing them 
directly. If the abuses hypothesized in Hein never emerge, then the 
plurality wisely avoided grappling with them prematurely. 
E. Minimalism Is Not Always the Appropriate Method of Adjudication 
Minimalism reaches its limit when fundamental notions of justice 
demand a ruling more expansive than minimalism provides. Some cases 
demand broad rulings,220 perhaps the most famous and revered being the 
landmark school desegregation case Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka.221 Such a rare and monumental case demands sweeping moral 
judgment: by 1954, the societal view of the Constitution had evolved to 
reject segregation to such an extent that the Court realistically could not 
avoid resolving the issue. A minimalist ruling––holding, perhaps, that 
although Topeka’s segregation program violated the Constitution, the 
school segregation programs in Virginia and Delaware222 could survive 
constitutional scrutiny—would likely have encouraged school districts to 
craftily tailor programs that fit within some narrower scope of acceptable 
discrimination. By contrast, consider the cases from 1976 that struck 
down some state death penalty laws while upholding others.223 Rather 
than holding the death penalty either constitutional or unconstitutional 
per se, the Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment to permit death penalty statutes that provide clear 
criteria for imposing the sentence but allow for discretion in the 
                                                     
218. There is sufficient doubt whether such abuses might occur. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2571. 
219. Cf. id. (“In the unlikely event that any of these [hypothetical] executive actions did take 
place, Congress could quickly step in.”). 
220. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 37−38. 
221. 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954). 
222. Brown involved consolidated cases challenging school segregation programs in Delaware, 
Kansas, South Carolina, and Virginia. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486.  
223. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding Georgia’s death 
penalty law for imposing the sentence fairly); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259−60 (1976) 
(plurality opinion) (upholding Florida’s law on similar grounds as Georgia’s law); Jurek v. Texas, 
428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding Texas’s law on similar grounds); Woodson 
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (striking North Carolina’s 
death penalty law as unfair because it triggered automatically for “a broad category of homicidal 
offenses”); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331−32 (1976) (plurality opinion) (striking 
Louisiana’s law on similar grounds as North Carolina’s law). 
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penalty’s imposition.224 After the Court handed down these minimalist 
opinions, states could narrowly tailor their statutes to fit within the 
approved ranges.225 
The decision to issue a broad ruling carries great risk and should not 
be made lightly. Brown came as the culmination of a protracted series of 
cases chipping away at the block of Jim Crow226 and thirteen years after 
the Court avoided the issue in Pullman.227 Other famous broad cases, 
like Dred Scott v. Sandford228 and Roe v. Wade,229 came suddenly, 
without buildup, and either proved disastrous (Dred Scott) or highly 
contentious (Roe).230 Only when the Court can be certain its moral 
judgment is correct and necessary should it issue such broad rulings, and 
even then this path is fraught with risk: the Court in Dred Scott perhaps 
felt the same moral certainty as the Court in Brown.231 
In the context of Establishment Clause taxpayer standing, the 
likelihood of such a morally compelling case seems unlikely because 
standing decisions focus on procedural requirements, rather than on the 
underlying substantive rights.232 Although Establishment Clause cases 
decided on the merits may call for broad rulings at times,233 standing 
doctrine is a naturally minimalist area of the law that seeks to limit court 
decisions on the merits to situations that require such adjudication.234 
Flast opened courthouse doors that were previously closed by 
Frothingham, but only enough to let the occasional plaintiff plead an 
Establishment Clause claim.235 Rather than eroding away at the 
                                                     
224. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (1976); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259−60 (1976); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 
276; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286, 305; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331−32 (1976). 
225. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 
524−37 (Simon & Schuster 2005) (1979). 
226. SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 38. 
227. See supra Part I. 
228. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
229. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
230. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 36−37. 
231. See id. at 37 (“[Dred Scott] shows that judicial efforts to resolve questions of political 
morality now and for all time may well be futile.”). 
232. The Establishment Clause taxpayer standing doctrine focuses on the nature of the underlying 
right, but it does not consider the merits of the specific alleged violation.  
233. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (incorporating the 
Establishment Clause to be applicable to the states, and beginning the intense judicial scrutiny of 
government involvement with religion). 
234. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 117. 
235. See supra Part II. 
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Frothingham ban, as Justice Douglas predicted,236 Flast created a narrow 
way for courts to hear seemingly meritorious Establishment Clause cases 
without abandoning the ban on generalized grievances.237 Cases like 
Valley Forge, Bowen, and Hein use minimalism to develop the Flast 
doctrine incrementally, leaving room for further corrections as needed. 
Just as Bowen clarified Valley Forge and Hein clarified Bowen, 
ambiguities in Hein can be clarified when required by the next case. 
Over time, if the Flast exception leads to unacceptable results or 
constitutional standing doctrine shifts to such an extent that Flast 
becomes anachronistic and unworkable, then the time may arrive to 
issue a broad ruling overturning Flast, much like Brown overturned 
Plessy v. Ferguson.238 On the other hand, perhaps morally compelling 
cases will emerge where Flast does not support standing and yet only 
taxpayers have any claim of injury at all. If the Court feels the moral 
duty to reach the merits on such a case, the minimalist approach taken by 
the plurality in Hein would not suffice. Justice Breyer suggested some 
hypothetical situations during oral argument in Hein that might fit this 
situation.239 Ultimately, such hypothetical cases would have to be 
evaluated on their facts if they ever actually arose, and the Court would 
have to decide if the merits were so compelling as to warrant finding 
standing, even if a narrow reading of standing doctrine counseled 
otherwise.240 
V. CONCLUSION 
Minimalism provides a method by which courts can address the 
narrow issues necessary to resolve the case at hand without broadly 
reaching out to decide, possibly erroneously, issues beyond the scope of 
                                                     
236. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 107 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
237. For an argument that all standing decisions should be evaluations of the merits of the case, 
see generally Fletcher, supra note 68. 
238. Brown v. Bd. Of Educ. Of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that doctrine of 
“separate but equal” has no place in public education). 
239. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16−19, Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found, Inc., 551 
U.S. ___ (June 25, 2007), 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (No. 06-157). Justice Breyer’s first hypothetical 
asked if a taxpayer would have standing to challenge the federal government’s construction of an 
official church at Plymouth Rock to commemorate the Pilgrims. Id. at 16. Justice Breyer also 
questioned whether taxpayer standing would be available to challenge a federal statute establishing 
one religion but that did not give money to any private religious groups. Id. at 17–18. 
240. See generally Lupu, supra note 134, at 155–64 (exploring the availability of both taxpayer 
standing and other forms of standing for difficult Establishment Clause cases post-Hein). 
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the current case. The Court developed Establishment Clause taxpayer 
standing in Flast as a narrow exception to the rule against federal 
taxpayer standing based on a two-part nexus test designed to limit 
standing to cases where taxpayer injury could be directly linked to the 
exercise of Congress’s taxing and spending power. Subsequent cases 
construed this exception narrowly, and the plurality in Hein maintained 
this minimalist approach by refusing to extend Flast to cover purely 
executive actions without Congress’s involvement. Over strong calls for 
the reversal of Flast, the plurality in Hein distinguished past cases to 
deny standing without disrupting precedent. Although this minimalist 
approach left open some difficult questions about separation of powers 
and possible abuses of executive discretion, these questions were 
properly left to be resolved later, should the need arise. Because the 
plurality avoided unnecessarily overruling precedent and left difficult, 
though hypothetical, problems to be resolved only when later cases 
demand resolution, this minimalist approach resolved the case at hand 
without running the risk of overreaching and making errors where no 
actions were needed. While the minimalist approach may fail in 
exceptional cases, for the majority of decisions, especially in areas of 
justiciability, the best thing the Court does is “not doing.”241 
 
                                                     
241. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 71. 
